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

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The decision to move

Post-exchange experiences in the former Bangladesh–India border enclaves

Md. Azmeary Ferdoush and Reece Jones

The residents of the enclaves along the Bangladesh–India border spent decades in limbo waiting for the two countries to address their precarious existence. When the exchange finally happened in the summer of 2015, many people were unsure of what to do next. When asked about future plans, a 33-year-old farmer in the Dohola Khagrabari enclave in Bangladesh, who had decided to relocate to India, answered:

> Plan? I don't have any plan. India has taken the responsibility of us. They are going to give us money, give us food, give us home. They are going to take care of our children, pay for their education and health. India took care of millions of Bangladeshis during the 71 war; we are now only 400–500 families. Are they going to throw us out? No, they will take care of us.

The enclave residents had long dreamed of the moment of exchange, but since it remained elusive for decades, many had not thought about what would happen if the exchange actually happened. They were now facing a dilemma. They could remain in their homes and become citizens of a new country as the enclaves were folded into the surrounding state or they could leave their homes, friends, and livelihoods and move across the border to the country of their citizenship, but a place that many of them had never even visited. The governments of India and Bangladesh expected large numbers to opt to move, but the enclave dwellers were more conflicted and in the end less than 2 percent (989 out of 55,000) finally decided to move (Shewly 2016).

The partition of British India in 1947 left the Bengal borderlands with a number of unresolved issues, including a vague and un-demarcated border and mapping errors that led to disputes (van Schendel 2005). However, one problem that started to gain attention in the scholarly world from the late 1980s was almost unnoticed during the partition: the existence of almost 200 political enclaves along the border. Although the first known initiative to exchange the enclaves was embarked on in 1932 by the British administrators, it took 83 more years to finally exchange the enclaves in the summer of 2015.

The chapter begins with a brief history of the enclave formation and the long process that resulted in the exchange of the enclaves. Then the chapter delves into the post-exchange issues

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for enclave residents of deciding whether to relocate and for state officials of merging these small but characteristically distinct pieces of lands into the state space. In doing so, it argues that a 'subsistence strategy', in addition to religion or ideology, played a particularly significant role for many of the enclave residents in choosing whether to remain in their homes or migrate across the border. It also suggests that the biggest challenge for India and Bangladesh is inscribing the organizing system of the state into these non-state spaces while incorporating the enclave residents into the citizenship regime of the state. Fieldwork for this chapter was conducted in two phases by the authors. The first phase was conducted by the second author during 2006 when there was no apparent possibility of exchanging the enclaves. The second phase was conducted by the first author during June and July of 2015 when the decision to exchange the enclaves was made and all the preparations for the exchange were occurring.[1] The first author conducted interviews with the residents who decided to stay in Bangladesh, those who decided to choose Indian citizenship, and different government officials. He also observed different practices and preparations for the exchange in government offices, including the (re)naming of places and the registration of enclave residents as they decided whether to move or not.

The conclusion considers the theoretical implications of the exchange. In the past, the enclaves were theorized as abandoned spaces and the failure to exchange them as symbolic of territory's allure that prevented states from even giving up land they had never possessed. In post-colonial South Asia, the enclaves' significance as symbol of nationalism overshadowed their role as ungoverned state territories for decades. Although more attention was cast on the dire situation of the residents in recent years, the exchange finally happened as the enclaves became a bargaining chip in negotiations between the two states.

The creation and exchange of the enclaves

An enclave is a portion of one state completely surrounded by the territory of another state (van Schendel 2002). According to Whyte (2002), Bangladesh and India shared 198 of the 256 enclaves worldwide until the enclaves were finally exchanged in 2015. At the India–Bangladesh border there were also counter enclaves (an enclave inside an enclave) and dual enclaves (two separate enclaves that are geographically contiguous with each other). To simplify the exchange, the governments agreed to ignore counter enclaves which means a counter enclave will automatically be merged and exchanged with the enclave. Additionally, in the 1974 Land Boundary Agreement (LBA), India and Bangladesh had already agreed not to exchange the dual Bangladeshi enclaves of Dahagram–Angorpota, which were the only enclaves that had actually been administered by their home state due to their close proximity to Bangladesh through a narrow corridor. This resulted in the exchange of a total of 162 enclaves in 2015 (Shewly 2013b; Ghosh 2015; MEA 2015). The total exchangeable land area of these enclaves was 98.5 km^2. Bangladesh and India respectively hosted 69.5 km^2 and 29.0 km^2 of these lands (Jones 2010). According to a census conducted by both governments from 14 to 17 July 2011, the total population of the enclaves was 51,549 among which Bangladesh and India respectively hosted 37,334 and 14,215 people (MEA 2015). Another count was carried out before the exchange from 6 to 16 July 2015 to remove the names of people who died and add babies born since the 2011 census. Three thousand more people were registered, most of whom were either newborn or newly married, making the total population almost 55,000 at the time of the exchange (*The Daily Star* 17 July 2015).

For years, several myths have circulated about the formation of the enclaves including outlandish stories of late night gambling and spilled ink on a map at the time of partition. However, historically the enclaves came into existence after the treaty between the Mughals and the

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Maharaja of Cooch Behar in 1713 (Whyte 2002; Jones 2010). The treaty allowed both parties to retain the pieces of lands they controlled at the time of the treaty even if they were surrounded by enemy territory. The British came to the subcontinent and started to gain control over territories in the mid-18th century and the first proper demarcation of the enclaves took place between 1937 and 1938 (Whyte 2002; Jones 2010). As the enclaves were kept unchanged, the Mughal enclaves ended up in the British territories (as the British were controlling the formerly Mughal territories) and the Cooch Behar enclaves were administered by the Kingdom of Cooch Behar. Prior to the partition of India in 1947, the existence of the enclaves was a local administrative issue which merely meant that some areas were administered by Cooch Behar while others by Rangpur. Without a formal border, the administrative distinction had little impact on the lives of residents.

The first attempt to exchange the enclaves was in August 1932 when the Director of the Land Records for Bengal requested that the Revenue Department exchange the enclaves between Cooch Behar and British India in order to simplify tax collection. Since Cooch Behar was an independent kingdom, this was the easiest practical solution. However, in March 1934, he was told that it was not possible because of protests from the enclave dwellers (Whyte 2002). This is the only known proposal of exchange before partition, and surprisingly the opinion of the enclave dwellers was taken into account.

The border created with the partition of India went through the area of the enclaves but the enclaves were not addressed in the original partition documents because the princely states, like Cooch Behar, were given the choice of whether to join India or Pakistan. When the princely state of Cooch Behar eventually decided to join India in 1949, the odd administrative enclaves became political enclaves, little islands of India and Pakistan completely surrounded by the territory of the other country (Whyte 2002).

After the partition, the first initiative to exchange the border enclaves was taken in 1953. The Pakistani Prime Minister Mohammed Ali hosted the Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in Karachi at the end of July 1953 and paid Nehru a return visit from 17 to 20 August. At these meetings, an agreement was reached to exchange the Cooch Behar enclaves, but several internal political issues in both states, as well as deteriorating bilateral relations between the countries, made things more complicated and the exchange could not be executed (Whyte 2002). Nevertheless, Nehru seemed to be very keen on resolving the enclave issue when he said on 4 June 1958 that 'Any two reasonable persons on behalf of the two Governments could sit together and decide them in a day or two' (quoted in Whyte 2002: 91; Cons 2014: 4). In the same year, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Firoz Khan Noon, visited Nehru in Delhi from 9 to 11 September. In this visit, they agreed to exchange the enclaves without compensation for the net territorial loss to West Bengal. They also decided to divide the disputed Berubari Union in half. Berubari was an area near the enclaves that had been mistakenly depicted as part of both countries on different documents produced during the partition (Whyte 2002).

The Nehru–Noon Agreement attracted immense criticism both in India and Pakistan. Nehru was criticized because he agreed to transfer half of Berubari and did not ask for any compensation for the territorial loss. The agreement was challenged in several court cases that dragged on for 13 years. The Indian Supreme Court finally decided that the exchange could proceed on 29 March 1971, but by that point East Pakistan (Bangladesh) had already declared independence from Pakistan three days earlier on 26 March 1971. On 16 December 1971, East Pakistan won its independence and became Bangladesh. The first Prime Minister of the country, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, had a friendly relationship with Indira Gandhi, the Prime Minister of India. Mujib visited New Delhi from 12 to 16 May 1974 to discuss many political and economic issues. On the last day, they reached an agreement based on the Nehru–Noon Agreement to

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exchange the enclaves and solve the land boundary issues between India and Bangladesh. This is known as Indira–Mujib Pact, the Land Boundary Agreement (LBA) or the Delhi Treaty (Whyte 2002; MEA 2015). According to this treaty, Bangladesh gave up its claim on Berubari, and in exchange, Bangladesh was allowed to retain the enclaves of Dahagram–Angorpota, which were only 178 meters away from Bangladesh proper. Bangladesh ratified the LBA on 27 November 1974, with an amendment in its constitution, but India delayed.

A series of political disputes between India and Bangladesh complicated the issue. The assassination of Sheikh Mujib in a military coup on 15 August 1975 created a hostile bilateral relationship. Additionally, the initiative of successive governments in Bangladesh to replace its alliance with the India–Russia bloc with the United States–Pakistan and Islamic world affected the mutual trust between the two governments (Lifshultz 1979). Over the 1980s and 1990s, different issues such as migration from Bangladesh to India, access to the Tin Bigha Corridor that connects the Dahagram–Angorpota enclaves to Bangladesh, India's suspicion that Bangladesh supported terrorists and insurgent groups, and the construction of the Farakka dam in West Bengal worsened the relationship. As a result, the enclave exchange remained overshadowed (Shewly 2012).

In 2009, the Awami League and Indian Congress Party came into power in Bangladesh and India, the same combination of political parties that signed the 1974 LBA. The Prime Minister of Bangladesh, Sheikh Hasina, Sheikh Mujib's daughter, visited India in January 2010 and expressed the desire to reach a final solution to the long-standing problem of border issues in the spirit of 1974 LBA (MEA 2015). All disputes over the un-demarcated sections of the border were resolved within a year of the visit (Shewly 2012). In September 2011, the Prime Minister of India, Manmohan Singh, was scheduled to visit Bangladesh. During this visit different bilateral treaties were to be signed, including the enclave exchange agreement, but at the last minute, the West Bengal state government convinced Singh not to sign the water sharing and border agreements. Hence, only a protocol was signed approving the exchange of enclaves, but the document lacked a fixed deadline (Shewly 2013a).

The lack of a fixed timeframe created dissatisfaction among the enclave dwellers on both sides and led to a sustained protest movement. For example, on 21 August 2011, residents of enclaves in India held a protest in the Metro Channel of Dharmatala, Kolkata demanding the exchange of the enclaves (Saha 2011). Enclave dwellers from both countries decided to turn off all the lights in the enclaves from 11 September to 12 September 2011 to demand a specific date of exchange (*The Daily Prothom Alo* 13 September 2011). The biggest and most serious strike took place in March 2012 in Putimari, an enclave of India situated in Panchagar district of Bangladesh. They began a hunger strike for an indefinite period with a three-point demand that called for the immediate implementation of the 1974 LBA as well as a definitive timeframe for the enclave exchange. The strike went on from 18 March until 11 April 2012 and only ended with a promise from the government of Bangladesh to press the issue with the Indian government (*The Daily Star* 11 April 2012).

The protocol, not surprisingly, was opposed in India again. On 18 December 2013, a bill was introduced in Indian Parliament for the implementation of 1974 LBA. The Bharatia Janata Party (BJP), the Asom Gana Parishad (AGP), and the Trinamool Congress Party protested the bill. Trinamool MP Derek O'Brian termed it as a 'Bangladesh Giveaway Bill' and Mamata Banarjee, West Bengal's Chief Minister and head of the Trinamool Congress, posted on her Facebook page 'We are not accepting, not accepting and not accepting [the agreement]. The state government will not implement it' (Cons 2014: 2). As time passed, the bilateral relations between the two states improved as they signed several smaller agreements that permitted India to use

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Bangladesh's sea port and established a road transit route through the country. These concessions from Bangladesh influenced the political leaders in India, including Mamata, to accept the implementation bill and it was finally passed on 6 May 2015, with a unanimous vote for the exchange (*The Daily Prothom Alo* 7 May 2015). The newly elected BJP Prime Minister of India, Narendra Modi, visited Bangladesh and signed the exchange treaty on 7 June 2015. At midnight on 31 July, the enclaves were formally exchanged between the two countries leaving Dahagram–Angorpota as the only remaining enclave.

After the exchange

After decades of waiting, the actual exchange happened quickly and smoothly. Both countries were keen to know the population of the enclaves and the number of people who wanted to stay and leave. The enclave residents were given two choices: stay in the country of residence and accept a change of citizenship or move to their 'home country' and retain their original 'official' citizenship there. Home country and official citizenship are in quotes because in practice none of the residents had contact with these home countries and had received no services from them for decades. They had lived in a de facto stateless existence for many years. While Bangladesh offered no incentives for residents of Bangladeshi enclaves in India to move to Bangladesh, India came up with a resettlement package for the people from Indian enclaves in Bangladesh to encourage them to move to India. The package included 500,000 (US$7,500) rupees per family, dry food for two years, kitchen utensils, animal feed, temporary camp in Cooch Behar, drinking water, medicine, healthcare, education, and eventually a house or flat (*The Daily Prothom Alo* 26 July 2015). At first, 1,006 enclave dwellers in Bangladesh opted to relocate to India while none of the enclave dwellers in India opted to move to Bangladesh (*The Daily Star* 17 July 2015). However, a few decided not to move later, making the number 989 (Rahman 2015). Scholarly work had predicted that most residents would want to stay in their homes, but it came as a surprise to both governments that so few decided to move (*The Daily Prothom Alo* 26 July 2015).

Although the relocation of the enclave dwellers was supposed to begin on 31 July 2015, it was postponed based on the complaints that some who had opted to move were threatened by others. After this, an observational period was introduced until 31 October when the enclave dwellers were issued a travel pass and could visit the place where they would be relocated in India (Ali 2015). In the end, a few changed their minds and 989 made the move to India by 30 November 2015.

The enclave dwellers reported numerous factors that shaped their decision whether to relocate. Choosing citizenship was not exclusively a matter of ideology or a sense of belonging for many of the residents. Critical factors were India's resettlement package and India's 'image' as a more economically solvent country than Bangladesh. For those that decided to leave, there were several significant factors including kinship ties, religion, and maintaining connections to both countries as a hedge against future problems. A 27-year-old farmer in the Dohola Khagrabari enclave in Bangladesh who decided to move to India explained:

> Look, it was not an easy decision. But I have to take care of my family and think about their future. I don't have anything here [Bangladesh]. I work in other's lands and struggle to make my ends meet… I have heard that they [India] will give us money, home, and everything. The Indian government will also provide education for my daughter, and I have heard that it is easy to get a job there. So why shouldn't I move there?

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Although religion was a significant factor, these other subsistence issues had more weight for many. A 31-year-old farmer from the same enclave, who also decided to move to India, when asked why, answered:

> I'm a Hindu, and I have struggled a lot here. I always feel insecure. India is *Hindustan* [the land of Hindus], and I belong there. My mother's brother lives there. Also, you know, India has offered money and support for us.

The Indian resettlement package was extremely generous, and many enclave dwellers had never had that much money and other facilities in their entire lives. Additionally, the enclave dwellers perceived that India was a place with new economic opportunities and numerous life chances.

Although they did not have a clear idea of what they would do once they moved to India, they were very optimistic and were depending wholly on the Indian government to help them settle in and start a new life. A 38-year-old farmer who decided to move from the same enclave expressed his plans as follows:

> Aaa….I have not thought about it yet. But I heard that India will take care of us, they will give us money, give us jobs, take care of our children. ….Look I have struggled a lot in my life so far. I am not anxious about struggling more. I am struggling here, it does not make a difference if I have to struggle there.

From his perspective, it was worth taking the risk on India's generous offer rather than remaining as a religious minority in Bangladesh.

Existing kinship ties in India was another important factor behind the decision to move for many. Most of the enclave dwellers have some relatives or immediate family members living in India. They had settled in India during different periods of time; for instance, during the partition in 1947, during the liberation war in 1971, and so forth. In most cases, families or individuals who were left behind either did not have enough resources to move and settle in India or did not want to. The resettlement package came as a boost for them to rethink their decision and join their relatives across the border.

A 48-year-old small shop owner from the Dohola Khagrabari enclave explained why he had decided to move:

> Look, most of my family members had moved there long before, and they are doing well over there. My uncle was the first to move there right after liberation (1971). He got married and settled there. Then my sister got married there. I am the only person living this side. I wanted to move but never had enough money and did not know what to do. Now, since India is taking us and also helping us to go there, I have decided to move with my family.

Not only had the enclave dwellers developed kinship ties in India, but many also made kinship ties outside the enclaves in Bangladesh. It is very common among the enclave dwellers to get married outside the enclave. As a result, the majority of the families living in the enclaves were already absorbed, to some extent, as regular citizens of Bangladesh.

For a few families, this allowed for a strategic decision to settle some family members in India and some in Bangladesh. Members who had already been regularized as Bangladeshi citizens decided to stay in Bangladesh and those who were still living in the enclaves decided to move

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to India. The idea is that if things get worse in Bangladesh, people living in India will help their counterpart in Bangladesh to move to India and vice versa. A large number of families were being split to execute this plan from different enclaves. For example, a mother from Dohola Khagrabari decided to move to India while her son was staying in Bangladesh. When asked why they had chosen to split, the son replied:

> I have a brother living on that side from the last 13 years. I have my own family here, my house, my land. I can't leave all these. But my mother wanted to go to India. So we thought, as my brother is already there, my mother can easily go and settle in. …Also, two brothers will be on two sides, if any one of us face problem on one side, the other one can take care and help to move in and out.

Religious identity also played a role in deciding citizenship, but not for all the enclave dwellers. The enclave dwellers who decided to move to India were almost all Hindu and they were following what has been a constant migration of Hindus from Bangladesh to India since 1971 (Samaddar 1999). The enclave dwellers who were interviewed thought that they should go to India because that's where they belong. As a Hindu, they should be in India, and they would feel more comfortable there. But this simple explanation does not account for the complexity of the situation. There were other Hindu enclave dwellers who decided to stay in Bangladesh and not a single Muslim enclave resident from India decided to move to Bangladesh. For many, it was not only the sense of religious belonging, but additionally the feeling of insecurity and other subsistence strategies that drove the decision to migrate or not. A 45-year-old enclave dweller in Dohola Khagrabari explains when he was asked if his religious identity had anything to do with his decision to move:

> Yes, of course. I am a Hindu, and I belong to India. India is the land of Hindus. Being a Hindu, I always felt insecure here. Now, after the exchange I feel more insecure. If I were a Muslim, I would not have taken this decision. But I think I will, at least, feel secure being a Hindu in India. Even if I can't make three meals a day there, I will be happy.

The most surprising result of the exchange is that not a single resident of the Bangladeshi enclaves in India decided to return to Bangladesh. The lack of a resettlement package from Bangladesh played a significant role in the decision. Furthermore, Bangladesh does not have as strong an economy as India has. Without a clear promise of assistance from the Bangladesh government, the move would have been very risky.

The decision to move was a calculated trade-off, a survival strategy rather than an ideological or emotional decision. For the 98 percent of the enclave residents who did not move, the sense of stability and belonging in their current situation outweighed any potential benefits of moving to an unfamiliar country, even if it was officially their home country all along.

Making state space

Local administrators were given the responsibility of executing the exchange with the help of other government agencies such as the police, magistrates, and border guards, but the planning was done at the highest level of the administration. For the officials of the state, the challenge of the exchange revolved around questions of legibility (Scott 1998, 2009). The former enclaves of India and Bangladesh used to be the non-state spaces within a state space where these two modern states could not extend their control. Scott (1998) argues that a state's attempt to

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make a society legible includes steps such as taxation, conscription, and prevention of rebellion. Moreover, he clearly demonstrates how non-state spaces become a headache for the state since these can be a 'zone of refuge' where people who want to avoid the state can go to escape the ordering systems of the states (Scott 2009). The enclaves long served as such a refuge because the police and courts of the surrounding states did not have jurisdiction in the enclaves and some criminals used that protection to evade the laws of the state.

The process of turning these newly incorporated lands into legible state territories had been the primary task of government officials in the post-exchange period. For example, none of these enclaves had any formal documentation of land records. The documents they had were obsolete because they were issued by the British Empire, the other country across the border, or locally made in an attempt to document ownership. The Land Record Office of Bangladesh did not have any record of these lands. To make these territories legible, both states have to conduct surveys to document what is there and bring it into the administrative space of the state. An Assistant Judge in Panchagar district of Bangladesh described the challenges:

> I think, it would take some time to normalize the situation in the enclaves. They have been living there without any legal and formal support. As a judge, I am expecting a lot of legal issues regarding land. They do not have any legal documents of their lands except the locally made and managed stamps. It will take time to sort all these out… Moreover, these enclave dwellers have been involved with different illegal activities which now should be easy to control by the legal system. You know, when these were not under the control of the state of Bangladesh, we could not do anything formally, and they [the enclave dwellers] have taken that advantage.

A 55-year-old farmer in Garati enclave who decided to stay in Bangladesh expressed his concern when asked about anticipated life after the exchange:

> Ummm…yes. I think there will be different problems too. You know about our land registration system, right? We don't have any state document for our land. We buy and sell our land in our own stamps. Now, for example, there are lots of people from Bangladesh residing around the enclave have bought lands from us. Also, there have been instances where some people have copied a stamp and claimed a land that does not belong to him. Now to registrar the land, if these two parties file a case in the court, who do you think the court will decide for? …Again, take the example of police. They did not used to come to the enclave as this was not Bangladesh. Now, after the exchange, they will have no problem coming in here and arresting us.

While both the judge and the former enclave resident were expecting complexities regarding land registration, taxation, and ownership determination, there were different perspectives on the changing position of the enclaves as a zone of refuge.

Many government officials share the judge's view that these enclaves are breeding zones of crime such as smuggling, selling drugs, and offering refuge to criminals. Since these lands were out of the legal governance of the state, they became safe havens for criminals. However, now that the enclaves have been brought under the sovereignty of the state, the officials thought it would be easier for the state mechanism to govern them. By contrast, the enclave dweller is happy to be a citizen of the state because it will formalize his land registration, but at the same time he is worried about not being treated equally. He had concerns about being a victim of unnecessary hostility and injustice by the state now that the refuge was gone.

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Conclusion: theorizing the exchange

The exchange itself opens up an interesting theoretical discussion in relation to the state's desire to hold territory. The persistent problem of exchanging the enclaves has been cited as an example of 'territory's continuing allure' (Murphy 2013) in which the desire to maintain control over land trumps almost any other consideration for the state, even when the state has never even had administrative control over the piece of territory. James Scott (1998, 2009) argues that a major problem of modern statecraft has been the need for legibility: to have calculable knowledge of the people, land, and resources that allowed a territory to be governed. States loathe to have non-state spaces within their jurisdiction, but in the case of the enclaves, neither India nor Bangladesh were keen to extend their control and govern the enclaves. Rather, both states were more interested in upholding these enclaves as symbols of their national integrity and holding onto them without even minimal control over them. As Jason Cons puts it, 'They are spaces that … the center thinks with intense passion, though not necessarily with great care' (Cons 2016: 21). Because of the 'intense passion' these enclaves became *amplified territories* which were transformed into territorial symbols irrespective of their size and strategic use (Cons 2016). In this context, particularly for India, holding onto these small pieces of land for decades was more important than extending control and administration over them.

Consequently, the fact that India and Bangladesh did eventually overcome this obstacle and exchanged the enclaves deserves particular scrutiny. For this, we turn to Evgeny Vinokurov's (2007) theory of enclaves and particularly the various relationships between the mainland, the enclave, and surrounding areas. Vinokurov (2007) argues that the nature of the enclave is determined by these different types of relations and typically the mainland–enclave relations are most significant. But in case of the India–Bangladesh enclaves, except Dahagram–Angorpota, none of the enclaves had any connection or relation with the mainland. Instead, daily life in the enclaves was mostly influenced and shaped by their relations with surrounding areas. Furthermore, they also became a significant pawn in negotiations between the two states that had little to do with the actual conditions in the enclaves. After the 2009 elections in India and Bangladesh, both the governments sowed interest in developing bilateral relations which included solving disputed borders and resolving trade relations. In the end—although there was constant pressure and protests from the enclave dwellers from both sides—the bilateral discussions between India and Bangladesh put very little weight on the conditions on the ground in the enclaves. Finally in 2015, a number of memorandums and protocols were signed between the two states which included Bangladesh sharing its sea port with India and allowing a road transit for Indian vehicles to pass through Bangladesh. Both of these were concessions on the part of Bangladesh and as an inducement India finally agreed to ratify the exchange agreement.

The exchange is both an end and a beginning. It marks the end of the unusual story of the enclaves, but it is only the beginning of the journey for enclave residents, who have to negotiate their new citizenship, and for state officials, who will work to bring the people and the land into the legibility regime of the state. While the exchange of the enclaves will solve many problems for both the former enclave residents and the states, the construction of infrastructure and the extension of the protections such as the citizenship to the former enclave residents will be a long term project on both sides of the border. The distinct geographical location, size, and population in each of the exchanged enclaves will require careful planning and individualized solutions. For now, the burdens of survival in a stateless enclave have been lifted, but much of the hard work of realizing the anticipated benefits of the exchange is still to come.

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Note

1 The second phase of reseach was conducted in the enclaves of Garati and Dohola Khagrabari under Debiganj subdistrict of Panchagar district. Debiganj subbsidtrict alone hosted 37 percent of the total enclave population in Bangladesh. Garati and Dohola Khagrabari enclaves were two of the biggest enclaves in size, respectively 4 and 11 km^2 (Whyte 2002). Also, they respectively hosted 125 and 255 residents who opted to move out from Bangladesh and settle in India (UNO Office Fieldwork 2015). All the respondents were selected purposively and interviews were recorded with a digital audio recorder with the consent of the interviewees. In the first group, he interviewed five adults from Dohola Khagrabarai and three adults from Garati enclave. In the second group, he interviewed five from Dohola Khagrabari enclave and in the third group he interviewed the Assistant Judge of Debiganj subdistrict and the Union Nirbahi Officer (UNO, the highest ranked administrative officer in a subdistrict).

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